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Giving Up Your Tax Refund to Keep It:
Tax Prepayment in the Context
of the Bankruptcy Estate
C.D. Bradley'
INTRODUCTION
When taxpayers file their income tax returns each year, those who have
paid in more taxes than they owe face a choice of which they may not
be aware. Almost all taxpayers take the refund. They have another choice,
though: they could apply the amount of the overpayment to their tax bill
for the following year. Assume one makes the latter choice and then files
for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection. A key tenant of bankruptcy law is
that any property owned by the debtor at the time of the petition becomes
property of the bankruptcy estate, and it is used to satisfy the debts which
necessitated the protection! The question presented is this: does the tax
prepayment become property of the estate?
Courts considering the question have come up with a variety ofconflicting
answers to it, from positive to negative to somewhere in-between. Over
the past twenty years, courts have failed to reach a consensus at the federal
circuit level, and the Supreme Court passed up an opportunity to do so in
early 201 LWhile these positions are supported by valid policy arguments,
these inconsistent holdings should not co-exist. Theoretically, there
is great appeal to the idea that the tax prepayment should be included
in the bankruptcy estate. Given several practical considerations and the
interplay of the applicable statutes, however, this Note argues that, in the
vast majority of cases, courts should hold that a refund used for prepayment
of future taxes should not become property of the estate.
Part I of this note examines how the Bankruptcy Code' defines property
of the estate, how courts have broadly construed that definition, and how one
i University of Kentucky College of Law, JD zoz. The author would like to offer sin-
cere thanks to Professors Jennifer Bird-Pollan and Christopher Frost for offering needed criti-
cism and advice.
2 See Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 642 (1992) ("When a debtor files a bank-
ruptcy petition, all of his property becomes property of a bankruptcy estate.").
3 Weinman v. Graves, 131 S. Ct. 906 (zoi i) (mem.) (denying certiorari to In re Graves, 609
F3 d 1153 (ioth Cir. 20io)). The case is discussed at length infra Part IV.B; see also infra text
accompanying notes 96-97.
4 The Bankruptcy Code refers to Title i i of the U.S. Code (hereinafter "Code").
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recent case placed limits on the generally broad scope of the estate. Part II
discusses the Internal Revenue Code's clear position that the taxpayer has
no rights to a refund or return of any prepayment. Part III reviews how this
tension has played out in a series of lower court rulings, with each reaching
a different result. Part IV compares the Ninth Circuit's decision in Nichols
v. Birdsell, which included the prepayment in the bankruptcy estate,' and
the Tenth Circuit's subsequent In re Graves decision, which excluded a tax
prepayment from the bankruptcy estate while holding open the possibility
of including a potential refund.' Part VI analyzes the interplay of federal
bankruptcy and tax statutes and how courts should ultimately resolve
the issue. This note concludes by recommending the adoption of a rule
excluding tax prepayments for the bankruptcy estate for those bankruptcy
petitioners whose debts are consumer in nature.
I. BANKRUPTCY'S BROAD CONCEPTION OF PROPERTY
Section 541 of the Code makes it-clear that commencing a bankruptcy
case creates an estate that is comprised of property "wherever located and
by whomever held."7 This includes "all legal or equitable interests of the
debtor in property as of the commencement of the case."8 As commentators
have noted, the language is broad by design; that intent is "evident from
the language of the [bankruptcy code]," and "[it would be hard to imagine
language that would be more encompassing."9
Courts have indeed construed that language broadly in a variety of
cases under both the pre- and post-Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,10
holding that a wide variety of interests are included in the property of the
estate."The Fifth Circuit, for example, opined that "[tihe scope of property
rights and interests included in a bankruptcy estate is very broad: [tihe
5 Nichols v. Birdsell, 491 F3d 987, 988 (9th Cir. 2007).
6 In r, Graves, 609 F3d 1153, 1158-59 (0oth Cir. 2oo), aw. denied, 131 S. Ct. 906 (2o 0).
The court in Graves acknowledged the Ninth Circuit's decision in Nichols and rejected its
ultimate decision. Id.
7 ii U.S.C. § 541(a) (2006).
8 Id.§541(a)(1).
9 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUpTCY § 541.01 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer, eds., 16th
ed. 2oio).
io Bankruptcy Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub.L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549. The Act is com-
monly referred to as the 1979 reform because of its effective date.
I I Those interests include "trademarks, corporate names, stock voting rights, property
held out by a corporate debtor's principal to be the corporation's property, a stipulated right
to possession of disputed property pending resolution of a lawsuit, money borrowed by the
debtor, the right to accept or reject a gift previously received by the debtor, and licenses." 8A
C.J.S. Bankruptey § 552 (2o I) (footnotes omitted).
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conditional, future, speculative, or equitable nature of an interest does not
prevent it from being property of the bankruptcy estate."' I
In 1966, the Supreme Court held that loss-carryback tax refunds are
part of the estate, 3 but the Court discussed the possible limitations of the
broad definition:
[The basic purpose of the statute] is to secure for creditors everything
of value the bankrupt may possess in alienable or leviable form when
he files his petition. To this end the term 'property' has been construed
most generously and an interest is not outside its reach because it is
novel or contingent or because enjoyment must be postponed. However,
limitations on the term do grow out of other purposes of the Act; one
purpose which is highly prominent and is relevant in this case is to
leave the bankrupt free after the date of his petition to accumulate new
wealth in the future. Accordingly, future wages of the bankrupt do not
constitute 'property' at the time of bankruptcy nor, analogously, does an
intended bequest to him or a promised gift-even though state law might
permit all of these to be alienated in advance.'
4
Given the inclusion of property in which the debtor has a non-
possessory interest, the Bankruptcy Code also provides a requirement that
any entity in possession of estate property "shall deliver to the trustee, and
account for, such property or the value of such property."15
Although tangential to the issues here, an Eleventh Circuit case found
a limit to the broad scope of the estate, 16 which is instructive in considering
the issue. A farmer lost much of his crop to drought in 2001, leaving him
unable to pay his bills and pushing him into bankruptcy. 7 After his petition
was filed,"s Congress approved funding to pay farmers who had suffered
losses from drought in 2001 and 2002.' 9The debtor applied for and received
this payment while his bankruptcy was pending, which opened the question
of whether the payment was property of the estate.2°1n ruling it was not,
the court stated, "[I]f Bracewell 'had no right or interest that constituted
property within the meaning of § 541(a)(1) at the commencement of the
case, then the payment he later received cannot be proceeds of property of
the estate under § 541(a)(6).'' The bulk of the majority opinion directly
12 In re Kemp, 52 F.3d 546, 550 (5th Cir. 1995); see also In re Yonikus, 996 Ead 866, 869
(7th Cir. 1993) ("In fact, every conceivable interest of the debtor[-] future, nonpossessory,
contingent, speculative, and derivative[-] is within the reach of § 541." (citations omitted)).
13 Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 380 (1966). This was prior to the 1979 Amendments.
14 Id. at 379-80 (citations omitted).
15 1 1 U.S.C. § 542(a) (zoo6).
16 In re Bracewell, 454 F3d 1234 (1 ith Cir. 2006).
17 Id. at1236.
18 He originally filed a petition under Chapter 12, but later it was converted to Chapter
7.Id.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 1236.
21 Id. at 1247 (quoting Burgess v. Sikes, 438 E3d 493 (5th Cir. 2oo6) (en banc)).
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
addresses the reasoning of the dissent, who argued for including the
payment in the estate:
The Supreme Court has held that the debtor estate includes contingent
interests that ripen into legal rights after commencement of the
bankruptcy proceeding .... The Court stated that "property" under
section 541 is "construed most generously and an interest is not outside
its reach because it is novel or contingent or because enjoyment must
be postponed.""2
The dissent also objected on the grounds that the payment, if not
included in the estate, became a "windfall" for the debtor.3Furthermore,
the dissent noted that "[t]he exclusion of the payment as proceeds of the
debtor estate violates the fundamental tenet of bankruptcy law to preserve
the security interests of creditors .... Under the majority's view, a debtor
can effectively void a valid security interest held by a creditor by filing a
bankruptcy petition." 4
While crop payments are not tax refunds, the issues at play - how
we define property and the limitations on that definition, as well as how
bankruptcy law interacts with other aspects of the law - are similar. Also
analogous are the divisions in the court when applying those conflicting
rules, with the majority narrowing the scope of the estate in the face of
other legal rules and the dissent favoring the broad scope of the estate.
Still, almost anything that could be construed as an interest is construed
in just that way and therefore included in the property of the estate. This
incorporation reflects the belief "that a chief purpose of the bankruptcy
laws is 'to secure a prompt and effectual administration and settlement
of the estate of all bankrupts within a limited period' ..... 1 s Applying a
broad scope to what comprises the estate simplifies that step as the case
moves towards a settlement, but only if the property in question is in the
possession of the debtor at the time of petition or can be recovered from
whoever holds it. If the property is not recoverable, there is the possibility
that rather than being "prompt and effectual", the administration of the
bankruptcy estate will draw out as the court struggles with how to deal with
those interests.
II. THE TAX CODE'S BRIGHT LINE
While the Bankruptcy Code seeks to be broadly inclusive, the Tax
Code 6 aims for certainty instead. The Tax Code allows taxpayers to elect
22 Id. at 1249 (Pryor, J., dissenting) (quoting Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375,379 (1966)).
23 Id. at 1248.
24 Id. at 1258.
25 Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323,328-29 (1966) (quoting Exparte Christy, 44 U.S. 292,
312 (1845)).
26 Tax code refers to Chapter 26 of the United States Code, which governs the federal
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to have overpayments applied to the succeeding year's tax liability.2 7 If
the taxpayer makes that election, "such amount shall be considered as a
payment of the income tax for the succeeding taxable year... and no claim
for credit or refund of such overpayment shall be allowed for the taxable year in
which the overpayment arises."8
The applicable Treasury Regulation reflects that idea, stating that "[a]n
election so to credit an overpayment of income tax precludes the allowance
of a claim for credit or refund of such overpayment for the taxable year
in which the overpayment arises. '"29 Both the Internal Revenue Service
("IRS") and the courts have unanimously and repeatedly held that the
decision, once made, is irrevocable.3°This is because "[a]t that point, the
amounts lose their character as overpayments for the years in which they
arose and become tax payments for the succeeding year."'" Courts have even
declared that the taxpayer loses any interest in the foregone refund, stating:
If a taxpayer makes such an election to credit part or all of an overpayment
to a succeeding year's estimated tax liability, no statutory interest ... is
allowable on the amount of the overpayment so credited.... If a taxpayer, such
as plaintiff, elects to credit an overpayment to its succeeding taxable
year's estimated tax liability, that election is irrevocable and binding
upon both the taxpayer and the [IRS]. 3z
If the taxpayer has no interest, not even a contingent one, then there is
nothing to include in the estate.33
Aside from the issue of the taxpayer's loss of interest in tax prepayments,
another relevant issue is the bankruptcy court's authority to issue orders to
the IRS. In 1992, the Supreme Court held that the IRS enjoys sovereign
immunity from monetary claims unless it explicitly waives it. 34 That
holding, and the subsequent enactment of a statute clarifying sovereign
immunity,3" generally bars trustees36 from seeking turnovers directly from
income tax among other taxes collected by the federal government.
27 26 U.S.C. § 6513(d) (zoo6).
28 Id. (emphasis added).
29 Treas. Reg. § 3 O1.65 13-I(d) (1955).
30 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 55-448, 1955-2 C.B. 595.
31 Fisher v. United States, 61 E Supp. 2d 62 1, 623 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (emphasis added).
32 Martin Marietta Corp. v. United States, 572 F.zd 839, 841-42 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (emphasis
added) (citations omitted).
33 sI U.S.C. § 541(a)0) (2oo6).
34 United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30 (1992), superseded by, ii U.S.C. §
I O6(C) 01994)-
35 § i o6(c); see S. Elizabeth Gibson, Congressional Response to Hoffman and Nordic Village:
Amended Section io6 and Sovereign Immunity, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 311, 326 (1995).
36 Vreugdenhil v. Hockstra, 773 Fzd 213, 215 (8th Cit. 1985) ("The trustee is the 'legal
representative' of the bankrupt estate, with capacity to sue and be sued. Furthermore, with
certain exceptions not applicable here, it is the trustee who is empowered under the Code to
avoid or subordinate security interests and liens, and to use, sell, or lease property of the estate
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the IRS; courts which have decided to include tax prepayments in the
estate have therefore either conceptualized the property interest as a credit
against future tax liabilities37 or sought a turnover of the resulting refund.3"
In either case, the typical bankruptcy rules have to be adjusted in the tax
context.
III. LOWER COURTS STRUGGLE TO DEFINE THE RULE
A. Simmons: Prepaid Taxes Are Not Property of the Estate
The first case was decided in the Middle District of Florida in 1991.39
The debtor filed his 1987 tax return in March 1988, opting to apply an
overpayment of $7,799.02 to his 1988 taxes instead of receiving a refund.4°
Six days later, he filed a petition for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.41 The trustee of
the estate subsequently sued the IRS seeking the turnover of the money.4"
The court noted that the bankruptcy code requires "all property of the
debtor.., to be delivered to the trustee", but clarified that this cannot "expand
the debtor's rights... more than they exist[ed] at the commencement of
the case." 431t therefore follows that "if those interests were limited at that
time, [then] the trustee's rights to possession are similarly limited." 44 The
court found such a limitation in the tax code's bar on seeking return of the
money, stating:
Thus, [the] debtor's overpayment, at his election, became a payment
of his 1988 estimated tax rather than an overpayment of his 1987
taxes. Once [the] debtor made this election, as a matter of law, he no
longer had an overpayment for which he could file a claim for refund.
Consequently, the debtor's prepetition estimated tax payment cannot
be considered a legal or equitable interest of the debtor in property as
of the commencement of the case, and such payment is not subject to
turnover.
45
in the ordinary course of business." (citations omitted)).
37 Nichols v. Birdsell, 491 F3d 987, 990 (9th Cir. 2007) ("As a result of the election, the
Debtors were left with a credit with the IRS that provided a dollar-for-dollar tax reduction in
the following year... .[T]his credit toward future taxes constituted estate property at the time
the Debtors filed for bankruptcy." (citations omitted)).
38 See In reCanon, 13o B.R. 748 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1991).
39 In re Simmons, 124 B.R. 606 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991).
40 Id. at 607.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id. (citing 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCYl 1 541.01, at 541-5,91541.oI, at 541-7 (15th ed.
1979)).
44 Id.
45 Id. at 607-08.
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Because the debtor made the transfer before filing the bankruptcy
petition, the court concluded, it could not be property of the estate.'
Next, the trustee argued that the election constituted a fraudulent
transfer, but the court held that there was not "evidence... [of] any actual
intent on behalf of the debtor to hinder, delay, or defraud ... creditors"
and, furthermore, that "the debtor received a reasonably equivalent
value... [for the] exchange .... ,,47 Thus, the trustee failed to prove the
requisite elements for a fraudulent transfer under the Code.4 Given the
"corresponding dollar-for-dollar reduction in his tax obligation" resulting
from the election, the latter element will necessarily be present and
therefore precludes avoidance on the ground of fraudulent transfer under
these facts.49
The trustee also tried to avoid the election on the grounds that it was
a post-petition transfer, but this argument was rejected by the court in
short order.5" The court held that "[tihe subject transfer was made by the
debtor prior to the filing of his petition. The debtor did not retain a legally
cognizable property interest which could be considered property of the
estate."51
B. Canon: The Resulting Refund Is Property of the Estate
Shortly thereafter, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District
of Texas considered a similar set of issues.5" The debtors filed their
1987 tax return on March 31, 1988.13 They had $62,887 withheld, which
included an overpayment of $14,900 they elected to apply to their 1988 tax
liability.4They filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy three months later.55
Unlike the Florida case, the debtors filed their 1988 return and received
a refund in the exact amount of their 1987 overpayment: $14,900.56 The
court latched on to that fact in distinguishing the two cases:
[W]e are not deciding the Florida issue. There the debtor needed
the overpayment which he elected to apply to his estimated tax liability
for the year in which he filed his bankruptcy petition to meet his tax
liability. In this case[,] the 1987 overpayment[,] which the [debtors]
elected to apply to their 1988 estimated tax liability was not needed
46 Id.
47 Id. at 6o8.




52 See In rrCanon, 13o B.R. 748 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1991).





for the 1988 taxes and was refunded .... [B]ecause the refund was
sufficiently rooted in the prebankruptcy past, it became property of the
estate as defined in §541 .5
Although the court did not consider the same issue as in the Florida
case, it construed Sega/38to support the opposite conclusion reached in
Simmons, 9 holding that "the [debtors'] inability to revoke the election and
claim a refund of the overpayment during the 1988 taxable year does not
remove the $14,900 in question from the property of the estate. ' 60 Segal,
however, dealt with a refund stemming from loss carryback to prior tax
years, not future years,61 and the court cited several other cases that also
did not rely on section 6513(d). 6 The court also noted that because the
Canons' 1988 withholding accurately reflected their tax liability for the
year, "the application of the 1987 overpayment of $14,900 to the 1988
estimated tax liability was virtually a savings account for the Canons.
63
The first two courts to consider the issue came to opposite conclusions,
with the second explicitly rejecting the reasoning of the first. A third court
would soon reject the reasoning of the second just as explicitly.
C. Block: Reasoning of Canon Court Rejected
Less than a year later, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of Texas, reviewing a case from the same bankruptcy court that decided
Canon, reversed a nearly identical decision on appeal.64The debtors filed
their 1988 income tax return in late April 1989, which would have amounted
to a tax refund of $11,807. 6STwo weeks after filing their original tax return,
and only two days before they filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the debtors
amended their tax return to apply the refund amount as a prepayment of
their 1989 taxes.'
In an interesting turn, when the trustee sought return of the
overpayment, the IRS returned it to the debtors instead of the trustee,
57 Id. at 752.
58 Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 380 (1966).
59 In reSimmons, 124 B.R. 606 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991).
6o In re Canon, 13o B.R. at 750.
61 Segal, 382 U.S. at 379-381. ("Without ruling in any way on a question not before us,
it is enough to say that a carryover into post-bankruptcy years can be distinguished conceptu-
ally as well as practically." Id. at 381.)
62 See id.at 751 (citing In re Doan, 672 F.2d 831,833 (I ith Cir. 1982); In re Orndoff, oo
B.R. 516, 517 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1989); In re Sutphin, 24 B.R. 149, 150 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1982);
In re DeVoe, 5 B.R. 618, 619-20 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 198o)).
63 Id. at 751-52.
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which the IRS conceded was an error in the course of the case. 67 The
debtors then "applied the funds to their 1989 taxes, in accordance with
their original intention. ' The bankruptcy court, in line with its decision
in Canon, found for the trustee and ordered the turnover of the funds. 69 The
District Court disagreed:
The Blocks made their election prior to filing their petition in bankruptcy.
Once they made the election, they no longer had an overpayment for
which they could file a claim for refund; the overpayment became
an advance payment of the Blocks' 1989 taxes. Consequently, their
"prepetition estimated tax payment cannot be considered a legal or
equitable interest of the debtor in property as of the commencement
of this case, and such payment is not subject to turnover." Once the
overpayment was properly transferred to the IRS pre-petition, it could
not become property of the estate, and was not recoverable under
Section 542 of the Bankruptcy Code. 0
The court also rejected the theory that once refunded, the money
should become property of the estate.71In doing so, the court reasoned that
"[tihe [debtors] had no right to the funds and, by reapplying the funds
to their 1989 taxes after the erroneous return of the funds, the [debtors]
merely returned to the United States its rightful property.""2
Up to this point, the courts that had considered the issue made clear,
yet irreconcilable, decisions: the prepayment was either in the estate or out.
The next court to consider it attempted to find some middle ground.
D. Orrill: Prepayment Excluded, Refund Included on Pro-Rata Basis
The fourth case, in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District
of Louisiana, followed Simmons in rejecting fraudulent and preferential
transfer arguments.73 In considering the receipt of a refund stemming from
the prior year's overpayment, however, it reached a different conclusion
than in Canon.74
The debtor filed his 1993 tax return in October 1994, showing an
overpayment of $14,121, of which he elected to prepay $9,993 to his 1994




70 Id. at 6 i (citations omitted).
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 See In re Orrill, z26 B.R. 563 (Bankr. E.D. La. 1997).
74 See id.at 566.
75 Id. at 564.
76 Id.
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filed his 1994 tax return, he received a refund of $1,795, which was directly
turned over to the trustee."
The trustee argued that the prepayment of $9,993 was recoverable
either as a fraudulent or preferential transfer, and, if not, then it was still
property of the estate.78Citing Simmons, the court summarily rejected
the first two arguments before turning to the third.79In holding that the
prepayment was not property of the estate, the court distinguished Canon,
finding that the debtor had not been refunded his overpayment from year
one after filing his year two taxes.8"
The Bankruptcy Court decided to split the difference 1 t held that the
original overpayment was not property of the estate:
However, the $1,795.00 refund following the 1994 tax year, insofar
as it is attributable to the pre-petition period, is properly considered
property of the estate.... [The trustee's] portion is the proportion of the
refund attributable to the number of days in the year before the petition
date, while the [dlebtor would be entitled to the portion of the refund
attributable to the number of days in the year after the petition date.8
Because the petition was filed on October 18, the court awarded
290/365ths ($1,426.80) to the trustee, with the balance going to the debtor.83
The lower courts' inability to come to any consensus would
be duplicated even as the issues rose to higher courts. This has
resulted in a circuit split between the Ninth and Tenth Circuits.
IV. CIRCUIT COURTS ALSO UNABLE TO FIND COMMON GROUND
To this point, the issue of whether tax prepayments were includable in
estate property had remained in the lower courts, which reached a variety
of conclusions. Two Circuit courts have since considered the issue, but their
opposing decisions have failed to bring much-need clarity to the issue.
A. The Ninth Circuit and Nichols: Property of the Estate
Almost a decade after Orrill was decided, the issue finally reached
a higher court- the Ninth Circuit." The debtors filed their 2001 tax
return in January of 2002.11 It included a $2,231.57 overpayment for their
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 See id.at 564-65.
8o See id.at 565-66.
8 i See id. at 566.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Nichols v. Birdsell, 491 F3d 987 (9th Cir. 2007).
85 In re Nichols, 309 B.R. 41 , 42 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2004), aff'dsub nom., Nichols, 491 F3d
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federal taxes, which they applied to their 2002 federal tax liability.8 6 They
subsequently filed a petition for Chapter 7 bankruptcy relief two weeks
later.8 7 They filed their 2002 tax return on February 4, 2003, using up
"virtually all" of the prior year's overpayment.8
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Arizona considered the
debtors' argument based on Simmons and Block that the overpayment was
not property of the estate, but rejected the precedents as non-binding. 9
The debtor argued that once the overpayment was applied to the following
year's liability, it was not property of the estate.9° The resulting credit that
caused a reduction in "future tax liabilities or, if there were no such tax
liabilities in the succeeding tax year, result in a refund[,]" however, would be
property of the estate.91 "That credit, although not immediately realizable
by the [d]ebtors on the petition date, was an asset that would ultimately
realize for the [diebtors a dollar-for-dollar value at the conclusion of the
succeeding tax year.... 9Z
The bankruptcy court noted that the ability to instantly liquidate the
interest is not required by the Code, and in fact that it allows for the transfer
of the property or the "value of such property."93 The fact that the debtors
could not recover the particular money prepaid in taxes did not preclude
them turning over its equivalent value: "As the Supreme Court held in
Segal, an interest is not outside of property of the estate simply 'because it
is novel or contingent or because enjoyment must be postponed." ' 9' The
court decided that the resulting tax credit constituted such an interest and
should therefore be included in the property of the estate. 95
The debtors appealed, and the Ninth Circuit decided the case in 2007
by affirming the lower court's ruling.' The court rejected the debtors'
argument that they had no right to the funds once the irrevocable election
was made.
As a result of the election, the [d]ebtors were left with a credit with the
IRS that provided a dollar-for-dollar tax reduction in the following year.
If the Nichols had not elected to prepay their taxes, those funds would
have been refunded to them and would likely have been available for





89 Id. at 43.
9o Id.
91 Id. at45, n.z.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 45.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Nichols v. Birdsell, 491 F3d 987 (9th Cir. 2007).
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days later. The fact that the election, once made, was irrevocable, does
not change the analysis. In light of the expansive definition of property
contained in the Bankruptcy Code and our broad interpretation of
"property" ... we hold that this credit toward future taxes constituted
estate property at the time the [dlebtors filed for bankruptcy. 7
In so holding, the court favored the Bankruptcy Code's inclusive
theory of the estate over the Tax Code's elimination of property rights in
prepayments. In effect, it held that the prepayment represented a property
right despite its lack of recognition as such in the Tax Code.98 It was the
first Circuit Court to take up the issue, giving its opinion some persuasive
value as the issue arose elsewhere, but not enough to convince the next
Circuit Court to consider prepayments that its decision was the correct one.
B. The Tenth Circuit and Graves: Not So Fast
Three years after Nichols, another Circuit heard a similar case. As we
have seen in our review of cases on this issue, lower courts found little
common ground, rejecting each other's reasoning seemingly every time it
came up. The Circuits have proven no different; the Tenth Circuit came to
a wholly different conclusion than the Ninth."
In July 2007, the debtors filed their 2006 tax return, which included
an overpayment of $3,000 they elected to apply to their 2007 tax
liability. 10°Within two months they then filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy.'
The Trustee sought turnover of the overpayment, but was denied by
both the bankruptcy court and the bankruptcy appellate panel.1 2 Looking
at the issue, the court reasoned, "The [t]rustee seeks to obtain from the
[d]ebtors that which they simply do not have: the amount they could have
received from the IRS in 2007, but did not." 103 The court pointed out that
the debtors had no right to the prepayment at either the filing of their
Chapter 7 or at the filing of the adversary proceeding.10 The court further
explained, "A contingent right to a refund in the event that the [d]ebtors
overpaid their 2007 taxes is not something, in our opinion, that is subject
to turnover. Simply put, under these facts, the [t]rustee may not take that
which the [d]ebtors do not have." '
97 Id. at 99o(citations omitted).
98 Seesupra Part II.
99 In re Graves, 609 E3d 1153 (ioth Cir. 2010).
ioo Id. at 1 155.
io' Id.
102 See In re Graves, 396 B.R. 70 (B.A.P. joth Cir. zoo8).
103 Id. at 73.
io4 Id. at 7 5 .
105 Id.
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The trustee then appealed to the Tenth Circuit, which ruled on the
issue in June 2010.1°6 The court noted:
One of the central precepts of bankruptcy law is that a bankruptcy
trustee succeeds only to the title and rights in property that the debtor
had at the time she filed the bankruptcy petition. Filing a bankruptcy
petition does not expand or change a debtor's interest in an asset; it
merely changes the party who holds that interest." 7
As such, the court held that the debtors, and accordingly the trustee, had
no right to any refund "until after their 2007 tax liability is determined, and
then only if they are entitled to a further refund. The portion of that further
refund attributable to pre-petition earnings would become property of the
estate." 108
While the court distinguished the case from Nichols in that it was
concerned with whether turnover was allowable rather than the Ninth
Circuit's focus on whether the overpayment was property of the estate, it
did concede that the court was "aware that, to a large extent, this holding
conflicts with the Ninth Circuit's decision in Nichols ..... ,19 Although the
Tenth Circuit limited its consideration to turnover, it allowed that the
Ninth Circuit's reasoning related to value exchange was appealing: "The
fact that all or part of a tax prepayment can be estate property, however,
does not determine the extent of the property interest in the hands of
the trustee nor ... does it determine whether that interest is subject to
turnover."'° The court also acknowledged and rejected the reasoning of
Simmons and Block."'
The court determined "that only the part of the refund that . . . is
attributable to pre-petition earnings and ...reverted to debtors after
application of the refund to their ultimate (2007) tax liability, is subject to
turnover.""' The trustee appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, asking the
Court to resolve the question of whether "bankruptcy debtors' contingent
or illiquid interests, such as a deferred tax refund reserved to reduce a
debtor's future tax liability, subject to turnover to bankruptcy trustees as
property of the estate under 11 U.S.C. § 542(a)?"" 3 The Supreme Court
declined to hear the case. 114
io6 In re Graves, 609 F 3 d i 153.
107 Id. at 1156 (quoting In re Sanders, 969 F.zd 591, 593 (7th Cir. 1992)).
io8 Id.
io9 Id. at 1158 (citingIn e Nichols, 491 E3d 987 (9th Cir. 2007)).
11o Id. at 1159.
iii Id. at 1157 n.i.
1IZ Id. at 1159.
113 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Weinman v. Graves, 131 S. Ct. 9o6 (zo I i) (mem.) (No.
1o-4oi), 2oio WL 3722o62.
114 Weinman, 131 S. Ct. 906 (denying certiorari).
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V. ANALYZING TENSION BETWEEN THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL APPROACHES
Normatively, there's great abstract theoretical appeal to including tax
prepayments in the bankruptcy estate. "[A] Chapter 7 filing by an individual
debtor effects such a critical cleavage between the pre-petition and post-
petition worlds that, metaphorically, bankruptcy is financial death." ' If
we apply that framework, from a financial perspective the debtor is now
"dead," with an estate to be settled, and has been reborn as a new and
separate financial entity. At the same time, "an interest is not outside [the
estate's] reach because it is novel or contingent or because enjoyment must
be postponed."'116 If the tax prepayment is considered as such an interest,
that would also support inclusion.
That theory, however, quickly runs into the practicality of the tax code,
which explicitly denies any right to a claim against the tax prepayment11
and thus implicitly undercuts the argument that it is an interest at all. As
noted above, the tax code denies the taxpayer any rights to a claim against
the overpayment once applied to future tax liability. 18 The Supreme Court
has defined property as being "more than the mere thing which a person
owns. It is elementary that it includes the right to acquire, use, and dispose
of it."1 19 In this instance, the taxpayer debtor can do none of those things
with the overpayment once the election is made. Furthermore, while the
financial death theory has appeal, it does not transfer to the tax code. The
debtor files a tax return that includes both pre- and post-petition income,
and the taxpayer's tax liability for the year is therefore based on both pre-
and post-petition income.12 0 The cleavage is substantial but not complete,
and therefore the fresh start goal of bankruptcy is substantially but not
totally realized in the income tax context.
These clashes of theoretical and practical considerations have divided
courts, which have variously held that overpayments of taxes applied to
I15 A Debtor's Rights Under Laws Not Yet Enacted as Property of the Estate, BANKR. L.
LETrER, Apr. 2oo2, at 4.
116 Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 379 (1966).
117 Seesupra Part II.
i18 26 U.S.C. § 6513(d) (2006).
I 19 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 6o, 74 (1917). The courts that have concluded that tax
prepayments should be included in the bankruptcy estate have analogized them to contin-
gent interests. Canon at 751, Nichols at 990. By definition, it is the enjoyment (or use) that is
contingent, not the acquisition or disposition: A contingent interest is "[an interest that the
holder may enjoy only upon the occurrence of a condition precedent." Black's Law Dictionary
(9th ed. 2009) (emphasis added). In the case of tax prepayments, none of those options are
available to the taxpayer.
12o In an individual Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the estate is treated as a separate tax entity
which must claim income derived from property of the estate, but that would not include
income earned prior to petition. See I.R.S. Publication 908 (Mar. 31, 2009).
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future tax liabilities either are property of the estate or are not. l"' Among
those who have held that it is not, the potential resulting refund has either
been held to be property of the estate in its entiretyl 2 or proportionately
property of the estate depending on the petition filing date."3
The Supreme Court passed on the opportunity to bring clarity to this
muddle by denying cert to the bankruptcy trustee in Graves. Given the
range of ultimately incompatible opinions, the Court should eventually
take up the issue, and when it does so, it should hold that tax overpayments
applied to future tax liabilities are not property of the estate. This position
has the benefit of simplicity and aligns nicely with the fresh start purpose
of bankruptcy protection while avoiding the inevitable problems any other
holding would necessarily trigger.
Consider the alternatives. If the court declines to draw a firm line
against inclusion in the estate, it has two other choices: default inclusion
in the estate, or exclusion with the lingering possibility of a reach-back of
some or all of any tax refund the following year.
As the court in Graves noted, including the overpayment in the estate
is problematic for the simple reason that the debtor neither has the money
nor can he or she get it back."2 4 While it is possible that the prepayment
might be refunded after the next year's taxes are filed, it is equally possible
that there will be no refund. Even if there is a refund, it remains an open
question as to what extent such a refund would be attributable to the
prepayment, and to what extent it would be attributable to the income and
withholding in the second year. For example, a taxpayer in year one elects
to apply a $1,000 tax refund to that year's liability, then files a bankruptcy
petition under Chapter 7. He has had $1,000 withheld for taxes up to that
point in the year. The taxpayer loses his job in July and ends the year with
less income than would be predicted by annualized withholding that began
on January 1, and is therefore due a $1,000 refund. Is the refund necessarily
due to the prepayment, or is it due to over-withholding during the first six
months of the year? This situation assumes a regular salary. What if the
taxpayer is paid piecemeal? If so, that could skew incentives to work post-
petition to balance out the tax liability and the amount prepaid or withheld.
In either case, the fresh start of bankruptcy is put on hold, because the
ultimate tax liability for the year by definition cannot be determined until
the year ends, no matter the date of the petition. Because the liability
necessarily depends on events both before and after petition, unless the
petition is filed on December 31 or January 1, it is impossible to determine
as of the petition what the impact of the prepayment will be, and it can be
121 See supra Part Ill-IV.
122 See Supra Part III B.
123 See Supra Part III D.
124 See In re Graves, 6o9 E3d 1153, 1156 (ioth Cir. 2010).
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equally difficult to determine ex post what would have happened but for
the prepayment.
This also ignores the possibility that tax losses in future years could be
applied backwards to previous years. If the tax prepayment is applied but
results in no tax refund, but then a loss two years later leads the taxpayer to
amend his return resulting in a refund, should the bankruptcy estate then
be reopened? Would such a refund be attributable to the prepayment, in
whole or in part?
In addition to the cases considered above, courts considering the issue
in several contexts have ruled that once taxpayers have made the election,
it is irrevocable and they have no right to a refund," 5 as the language of
the tax code makes clear.1 16 In that way, such prepayments are most closely
analogous to taxes withheld from pay, which are also not property of the
estate unless they result in a refund."2 7 Furthermore, it is important to
remember that the court in Block held that the Internal Revenue Service
enjoys sovereign immunity from "an action seeking monetary recovery in
bankruptcy."'
If the trustee cannot compel the Internal Revenue Service to turn over
the money, that leaves only the debtor, who doesn't have it at the time of
petition or presumably for many months afterward. For the reasons outlined
above, the taxpayer may or may not get a refund the following year, which
may or may not be directly attributable to the prepayment. If there is no
refund forthcoming, the debtor has only two possible sources of money:
pre-petition property that would otherwise be shielded by bankruptcy law
exemptions, or post-petition income which is otherwise protected by the
Bankruptcy Code2 9 and its goal of providing a fresh start. Both options are
necessarily at odds with the underlying policy purposes of bankruptcy.
The court in Graves declined to include the overpayment in the
bankruptcy estate but left an opening for the trustee in case the debtor
was due a tax refund the next year.30 In that case, the court determined
that the estate maintained a "contingent reversionary interest in the pre-
125 See Georges v. United States, 916 F.zd 1520, 1521 (1 ith Cir.199o); Fisher v. United
States, 61 F.Supp.2d 621,623 (E.D. Mich. 1999) ("When a taxpayer files an income tax return,
rather than obtaining a refund of overpayment, he may indicate on the return that all or part
of the overpayment shown on the return is to be applied to his estimated tax liability for the
following year. Such an indication constitutes an election to so apply the overpayment and,
once indicated, the election is irrevocable." (footnote omitted)).
126 See supra Part II.
127 See, e.g., In re Barowsky, 946 F2d 1516, 1518 (oth Cir. 199) ("Every court that has
considered this issue has held that the portion of an income tax refund that is based upon the
pre-petition portion of a taxable year constitutes property of the bankruptcy estate.").
128 In reBlock, 141 B.R. 6o9, 611 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992).
129 The bankruptcy estate only includes "interests of the debtor in property as of the
commencement of the case." II U.S.C. § 541(a)(i) (zoo6)
130 See In re Graves, 609 F3d 1153, 11590oth Cir. 2010).
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payment attributable to pre-petition earnings."I3IThe court acknowledged
the contrary analysis of Block and Simmons, but dismissed it, stating, "Given
that some part of an applied refund may be available after the ultimate tax
liability is determined and that part of that amount may be attributable
to pre-petition earnings, we think a more comprehensive result is as
expressed herein." '32
The two "mays" above neatly illustrate the problem with this
compromise. The first indicates that there's no guarantee of a refund.
That is largely due to the uncertainty of future behavior; whether there
is a refund after the liability is determined will usually depend on what
happens post-petition, namely how much of the debtor's income is
withheld for tax purposes. Such a rule, if implemented, would incentivize
lowering withholding to a level that would result in no refund. The flaw
can be demonstrated by considering the alternative result: if the applied
overpayment was not enough to cover the tax liability, it would be the
post-petition debtor, not the bankruptcy estate, who would have the
responsibility to make up the shortfall, even though the tax liability stems,
in part, from pre-petition income. It would also necessitate keeping open
a bankruptcy estate until tax liability could be determined, cutting against
the goal of prompt and efficient administration of the estate and delaying
the fresh start.133 For consistency's sake, if we are to keep the estate open to
claim a refund, it should also be liable for any withholding shortfall. For all
those reasons, such a rule would work at cross-purposes with the purpose
of Chapter 7 bankruptcy in part by effectively creating another potential
debt.
The second "may" alludes to a problem that the courts which have
chosen this path have found to be tricky, without any clear answer. The
question was not at issue in Graves because there had yet to be a refund.
It did arise, however, in two of the aforementioned cases. In Canon, the
refund was the same amount as the overpayment, and the court ordered
the turnover of the full amount, calling it "virtually a savings account" for
the debtors.-' In Orrill, the refund was less than the overpayment, and the
court used a proportionality test, allowing the trustee to obtain a turnover
131 Id.at1156-57.
132 Id. at 1157 n.i.
133 In 2oio, "the mean time interval from filing to disposition [of Chapter 7 bankruptcy
cases] was 178 days, and the median... was I2o days, "meaning that around half of all Chapter
7 bankruptcies are resolved in four months or less. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, OFFICE
OF THE JUDGES PROGRAM, 2010 REPORT OF STATISTICS REQUIRED BY THE BANKRUPTCY ABUSE
PREVENTION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2005 13 (2o I), available at http://www.us-
courts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/BAPCPA/2o10/20ioBAPCPA.pdf.
134 In re Canon, 13o B.R. 748, 752 (Bankr. N.D.Tex. 19i).
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of the share of the refund equal to the portion of the year in question before
the bankruptcy petition was filed. 3 '
The Canon rule more heavily incentivizes lower withholding levels, but
it also requires as its basis an assumption that the estate's right to pre-
petition income overrides the debtor's right to post-petition income. The
payment of the tax liability comes from both sources, but the rule would
return all of what it declares the estate has a right to - which clearly remains
an open question - while granting none of what the debtor has a right to
under the plain meaning of the bankruptcy statute.'-
6
The Orrill rule attempts to remedy that problem, but uses an arbitrary
method to achieve that end. It uses the date of the petition to determine
the proportions without regard to when the income was earned, a question
of little matter for tax purposes but of vital concern in bankruptcy. If the
income was earned wholly or disproportionately pre-petition, the rule would
favor the debtor in much the same way it's trying to avoid: by allowing pre-
petition earnings to bypass the estate. If the income was disproportionately
earned post-petition, it violates the debtor's right to post-petition income
designed to provide the fresh start. In either case, it fails to find an answer
that reflects the spirit of the bankruptcy rules.
As an aside, the pro-rata method is also often applied in the simpler
cases of a tax refund from a tax year in which the taxpayer petitioned for
bankruptcy protection. 3' Doing so invites taxpayers to game the system
by reducing or stopping withholding as far as the tax code allows as soon
as they file their petition or as soon as they've had enough withheld to
meet their likely tax liability. That the rule offers such an obvious and easy
workaround illustrates its flawed nature while again underscoring how
post-petition actions can change the nature of the bankruptcy estate if
courts follow this line of reasoning.
Again, this also defies the financial death metaphor of bankruptcy,
with the scope of the estate decided in part by decisions made by the
financially-reborn debtor post-petition.' 38 The ability to, in effect, change
the past from a bankruptcy perspective illustrates the key clash between
bankruptcy and the tax code. The former divides time by the filing of the
petition, with all events happening either before or after that date. The
latter divides time into tax years, in the case of individuals almost always
from January 1 to December 31. Those timeframes very rarely align, and
that lack of synergy invites conflict when courts are forced to apply both
bankruptcy and tax law to any given set of facts. In the factual confluence
135 In r Orrill, 226 B.R. 563, 566 (Bankr. E.D. La. 1997).
136 See Fisher v. United States, 6i F. Supp.2d 621, 623 (E.D. Mich. 1999).
137 See In re Meyers, 616 F3d 626, 628-29 (7th Cir. 2010).
138 Even assuming pre-planning, myriad decisions and elections which affect the out-
come of this question - for example, whether or not to apply loss carry forwards or carry backs
- must be made at the time of filing a tax return the year after petition in this scenario.
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examined herein, that is the crux of the problem. Given that the nature of
the two legal regimes are dependent on those conceptions of time, and that
the conflict cannot be addressed by bringing them into alignment on that
level, courts have two options. They can either try to design rules that bend.
the two closer together (which often appears to be the legal equivalent
of forcing a square peg into a round hole), or they can opt to avoid that
issue, in effect choosing simplicity and predictability over the opportunity
to come to a normatively more attractive decision no matter the difficulties
involved. The costs in money, time, and judicial efficiency in seeking such
an ideal outcome seem to far outweigh the benefits.
That cost-benefit analysis shifts further toward the simpler approach
of excluding tax prepayments from the bankruptcy estate given recent
changes in the Code. In particular, the means test,13 9 implemented in the
2005 bankruptcy reform, serves to curb potential abuses. The test creates
a presumption which pushes most debtors with above-median incomes
out of Chapter 7 and into Chapter 13 bankruptcies. Generally limiting the
availability of shifting potential refunds to a time after discharge to those
people whose incomes are below the median of their states serves both to
place a soft ceiling on the amount of the refund in question as well as offer
the benefits to those presumably most in need of a fresh start.
It must be noted that the means test only applies to debtors "whose
debts are primarily consumer debts," and allows for dismissal or conversion
to a Chapter 11 or 13 case if the debts are instead non-consumer, or
business, in nature1 40 The overwhelming majority of Chapter 7 cases in
recent years involve consumer debt rather than consumers with business
debt.'4 1The small percentage of cases that do involve primarily non-
consumer debts, however, are not subject the means test. It stands to reason
that such business-savvy debtors are in a better position to pre-plan their
bankruptcy well enough in advance to take advantage of a rule excluding tax
prepayments from the property of a bankruptcy estate. Accordingly, while
this article recommends the adoption of a rule excluding tax prepayments
from the property of the Chapter 7 estate, the recommendation is limited
only to those cases involving primarily consumer debts which are subject to
the means test. Again, that limitation excludes a small fraction of Chapter
139 See 11 U.S.C. § 7 07(b)(I)-(2)(A)(iii) (2oo6).
140 Id. § 707(b)(i).
141 In each of the past three years, more than ninety-six percent of Chapter 7 filings
have involved primarily consumer rather than business debt. In calendar zo 1, 992,332 peti-
tions were filed under Chapter 7; of those, 958,634 involved debts that were primarily con-
sumer rather than business debt. Bankruptcy Statistics - Filings, U.S. CTs..http://www.uscourts.
gov/statistics/bankruptcystatistics.aspx under (follow "12-month period ending December"
hyperlink) (last visited June 12, 2012). In 200n, 1,139,6o Chapter 7 petitions were filed and
iioo,116 involved primarily consumer debt. Id. In 2009, 1,05o,832 Chapter 7 cases were filed,
with 1,oo8,870 involving primarily consumer debts. Id.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
7 cases, fewer than four percent in recent years. 4 It also serves to protect
those debtors whose income falls below the median where they live - the
debtors who are most likely in need of help while seeking a fresh start -
while not extending such assistance to often more sophisticated debtors
who seek to take advantage of the bankruptcy process.
While many of the other arguments in favor excluding such tax
prepayments from the estate - primarily simplicity and efficiency - still
apply, on balance the probable sophistication of business debtors and their
added incentive to take advantage of such a rule argue against offering them
its protection. Further, the statute contemplates abusive use of Chapter 7
bankruptcies and gives courts the authority to convert Chapter 7 cases to
chapters 11 or 13 "if it finds that the granting of relief would be an abuse
of the provisions of this chapter."' 4 3 Because courts can dismiss the most
abusive cases, whether they involve consumer or business debts, adopting
the rule urged by this note does not completely tie the hands of judges
faced with obvious system-gaming. Still, in consumer debt cases, the
simplest and most efficient solution remains exclusion of tax prepayments
from the estate.
CONCLUSION
In addition to the theoretical support for excluding these tax
prepayments from the bankruptcy estate, several policy arguments illustrate
the strong practical benefits. Such a rule simplifies the bankruptcy process
by more clearly defining the scope of the estate at the date of petition,
rather than leaving that an open question, which allows debtors to take
actions post-petition to change the estate. When half of all Chapter 7
bankruptcies are completed in four months or less, and the average case
lasts less than six months, 1" it does not appear worth it on balance to leave
the estate open for an additional year or more for a potential refund that
may not be forthcoming, particularly given that whether or not there is a
refund necessarily depends on what happens post-petition. Should there
be a refund, whether it is attributable to the pre-petition income can be a
difficult question to answer; keeping the prepayment out of the estate both
eliminates the need to make that determination as well as using flawed
calculation methods to do so.
Finally, it would support the fresh start idea underlying bankruptcy,
both by preserving the full rights of post-petition income to the debtor
and shortening the process to bring discharge and the payback of creditors
142 Id.
143 § 707(b)(i). In (b)(3), the statute directs courts considering the question of abuse to
consider whether the petition was filed in bad faith or the totality of the circumstances. Id.§
707(b)(3).
144 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, Supra note 133, at 13.
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about more quickly. For creditors, the certainty and efficiency this rule
brings generally outweighs the potential recovery of additional money
at great expense and a year or more later. For debtors, it maintains the
possibility that the bankruptcy process can be brought to conclusion in
months, usually four or less, rather than lasting substantially more than a
year. And for courts, facing a rising caseload,' g it allows for quicker and
simpler case administration.
None of the various methods courts have used to tackle this issue are
without flaws, and each has its own merits. Embracing the tax code's bright
line against including overpayments applied to future tax liabilities makes
the most sense because it guarantees more efficient outcomes rather than
seeking what may be more theoretically pleasing results through the use
of sometimes arbitrary metrics and subject to actions taken post-petition.
Applying a clear rule that brings about quicker resolutions offers benefits
to debtors, creditors and courts alike. For those reasons, tax prepayments
applied to future tax liabilities should be excluded from the estate property
in the overwhelming majority of Chapter 7 cases that involve primarily
consumer debt.
145 Bankruptcy filings rose fourteen percent in 2010 to nearly 1.6 million cases. JAMES
C. DUFF, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTORIO (20io), available athttp://www.uscourts.gov/us-
courts/FederalCourts/AnnualReport/2o io/images/annualReport 20 i o.pdf.

